Abstract
Introduction
In 1995, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo left plastic bags filled with sarin, a nerve gas, on the Tokyo subway. A dozen people died and more than 5,000 were hurt. The toxin was only 25% military strength, otherwise the toll would have been far worse. The cult also was experimenting with VX, a nerve gas 10 times more deadly than sarin… 1 
-Barbara Slavin
Recently, the Russian Duma voted to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Treaty, bringing to an end the historic year of 1997, which saw the same treaty ratified by the United States Senate. 2 The treaty, first completed in 1992, signed by over 160 nations in 1993, and entered into force on April 29, 1997, calls for the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and the elimination of all chemical weapon production capability. During the intense and heated negotiations that led to this treaty, methods to monitor and verify compliance with the treaty, as well as penalties for non-compliance, were some of the more hotly debated topics. This paper will discuss these issues, as well as other issues that have developed in the more than five years since the treaty was first completed. Specifically, this paper will address the need for a follow-on to the CWC, based on the changes that have occurred politically since 1992, and because of technological improvements which might affect the ability of nations to effectively monitor the treaty in the future. This paper will try to look into the future by first discussing the history of the treaty, both the important timelines and specifics of the treaty itself. Then it will analyze the changes in the political landscape, to include the 1997 confrontation between Iraq and the United Nations' weapons inspection team, and how non-state players like terrorist groups are affected. Included in the politics of the treaty will be a review of some limitations of the treaty that could cause future re-evaluation. Finally, changes in technologies which could affect the capabilities of nations to monitor for compliance will be addressed.
Notes History …keep in mind that this treaty is not about our weapons. The United States is getting rid of its chemical weapons stockpile, regardless of what happens with the CWC. This treaty is about other countries' weapons, and whether to call on other countries to do the same thing we are doing.
1 -John D. Holum
Timelines
The history of the CWC dates back to the 1925 Geneva Protocols, which banned the first use of chemical weapons during conflicts. 2 The CWC, which bans all use of chemical weapons, was first put forward in 1968, after the issue of chemical weapons gained a good deal of public and congressional attention in the United States because of an accidental dispersal of nerve agents over lands near Dugway Proving Ground in Utah that killed several thousand sheep. 3 Because the Cold War and the nuclear arms race garnered most of the world's attention at the time, it remained dormant until 1984, when then-Vice President George Bush offered to amend the verification part of the treaty by pushing for "anytime-anyplace" challenge inspections, which became the core of the treaty's verification protocol. 4 The United States followed that up in 1985 by declaring their intent to destroy their entire chemical stockpile, and urged all other nations to follow suit. • The U. S. would forfeit their seat on the Executive Council for at least one year, thereby costing them the chance to draft the rules by which the Convention would be enforced.
• The U. S. would not be able to participate in the critical first sessions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which monitors compliance.
• The U. S. would lose the right to administer and conduct inspections.
• Because of trade restrictions imposed on non-member states, U. S. chemical manufacturers were concerned that they would risk serious economic loss. 6 The U. S. was able to get the treaty ratified before the entry into force date (see Figure 1 ), and the Russian Duma ratified the treaty in early November, assuring both countries a place at the international conference of signatories in December 1997. 7 The price the Russian government paid for signing after the entry into force date was the absence of Russian citizens from the OPCW's 369 staff members and 140 inspectors, as well as no Russian involvement in early OPCW decision making. The CWC bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons. The compliance part of the treaty was the most intensely debated part because it makes unprecedented demands on all parties. Governments, even those in compliance, may be subjected to on-site, short-notice challenge inspections at facilities so sensitive their very existence has not been publicly revealed. Parties may be required to impose assisting in design and construction of a prototype facility for the destruction of chemical weapons. 21 The prototype facility will be built at Shchuch'ye, about 800 miles southeast 
World Resolve
There are really two parts to the world resolve issue, the ability to do challenge inspections, and the willingness to impose sanctions for violations. Both issues will severely challenge the OPCW as it tries to administer the treaty.
The nature of challenge inspections has changed dramatically from the "anytimeanyplace" proposal from 1984. The major opposition to these no-notice challenge inspections was based on the fear by many, including the United States, that during the course of these inspections, industrial espionage would occur and valuable trade secrets would be compromised. Companies are concerned they will incur a loss of confidential business information in the course of on-site inspections or as a result of treaty-imposed reporting requirements, which will effect their competitiveness and possibly even their viability. 2 Because of this, whenever a challenge is issued, the challenged country is allowed a reasonable amount of time to sanitize the suspected site so that none of their legal processes are revealed. Critics of the treaty have claimed the challenge inspection protocol has lost its teeth, because the time allowed would allow any potential violator the opportunity to hide/move all the incriminating evidence. This was brought into focus by the 1997 Iraq confrontation with the United Nations special weapons team. It was noted that Iraq effectively stonewalled the team and allowed itself the chance to remove any incriminating evidence, and the protocols associated with the UN ban were supposedly more restrictive than the CWC protocols. This issue will have to be monitored very closely because it is one of the cornerstones of the treaty itself. How the nations of the world deal with states that do not comply with this requirement of the treaty will ultimately determine the success or failure of the treaty.
The second issue, the willingness of the signatories to impose sanctions against violators, is considered by critics as another weak part of the treaty. The main issue is money, because trade in chemical agents is important to the economy of many countries.
During 1994, the total sales value of chemicals exported from the United States exceeded $51 billion, up 15 percent over the previous year. 4 In another example, Russia claimed that chemicals made up 40% of all its exports, and failure to ratify the treaty could have cost them as much as 60 billion dollars a year. 5 It has been speculated that once Russia ratified, Iran followed suit to protect its important chemical industry. With Russia,
China, India and all major Western European nations inside the treaty framework, Irana major oil-producing country-thought it could be shut out of most markets for its petrochemicals. 6 In a country with a struggling economy, how willing would that country be to voluntarily restrict itself from trading with one of its customers. Obviously, this would threaten the viability of the treaty itself, and it must be monitored closely as the rounds of inspections begin.
Non-State Actors
In dealing with the CWC, non-state actors fall into two different categories, terrorist groups and commercial manufacturers. In one sense, the two groups could be looked at the same way because neither of them is directly controlled by the nation's government.
The issue of how the treaty will treat terrorist groups could simply be dismissed by stating the treaty only deals with sovereign nations. In this sense, the CWC will effect how countries deal with terrorist groups because every country is required to adopt domestic legislation that criminalizes the behavior prohibited by the treaty. That means law enforcement tools against potential terrorist use would be improved. Now law enforcement agencies can only go after a "conspiracy to use" chemical weapons. Under the CWC implementing legislation, simple possession will be a basis for action. 7 But the issue is more complex than that, because the terrorist groups will either be operating inside the boundaries of signatory states, or inside the boundaries of the few countries that haven't ratified the treaty. In the first case, consider that Iran has ratified the treaty, and Iran is a country that harbors terrorists. If one of the terrorist groups in Iran is discovered to be developing chemical weapons, then Iran has an obligation to take action against them. Failure to do so would be grounds for sanctioning Iran under the treaty. In the second case, where the terrorist group is operating inside a state that hasn't ratified the treaty, then the group will be treated the same way the state is treated.
However, now that Iran has ratified, it is very likely other countries associated with terrorist groups, like Libya and Syria, will also ratify over time. That happened with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which now has 185 members, including many, like
Iraq and North Korea, that have an interest in nuclear weapons. The gravitational pull, trade restrictions and the intense international attention would probably draw Libya and Syria into the CWC. can be monitored for compliance. 11 Once the export control lists are updated, the issue will basically come down to whether the manufacturer is producing an illegal chemical, or selling precursor chemicals to a treaty violator. Once again, the strength of the monitoring process and the willingness to impose sanctions will come into play depending on how many manufacturers try to circumvent the treaty and get caught. 12 What makes this issue so potentially dangerous is the tremendous quantities of chemicals involved, and the countries involved in dumping them. As stated earlier in this paper, the two countries with the largest current stockpiles are Russia and the United States, with 40,000 and 31,000 tons respectively. After World War II ended, the occupying powers were responsible for all the Nazi chemical weapons in their zone. The captured German chemical weapons totaled over 296,000 tons; the American zone had almost 94,000 tons, the British zone over 122,000 tons, the Russian zone over 70,000
Weapons not covered by the treaty
tons, and the French zone over 9,000 tons. 13 All these chemicals ended up dumped in the sea, and no one knows what kind of health and environmental risks these chemicals pose today or will present tomorrow. This issue will have to be addressed in the future, possibly after all the present chemical stockpiles are destroyed.
Notes

Technological Issues
The technological issues mainly revolve around the ability to monitor the treaty for
compliance. An essential part of this is to understand how the monitoring of the treaty was envisioned to be carried out, and then to understand what capabilities are on the horizon that could affect the monitoring of the treaty.
Current Treaty Monitoring
The verification system set up by the CWC looks at both military installations and wide segments of the commercial chemical industry. Since a lot of chemicals have a dual-use capability, the plants that produce them in significant quantities need to be monitored. The verification system is designed to limit chemical weapon activities Some critics of the treaty have said the treaty is not verifiable, since it is impossible to detect small quantities of chemicals. Although it would be difficult to detect production of a small quantity of a forbidden chemical, that small quantity isn't a threat until the country has produced enough of the chemical. Once the quantity grows to be militarily significant, and as the country involved begins to weaponize it by putting it into shells, training with it, or preparing to use it, the likelihood of detection rises dramatically. So militarily significant violations are likely to be detected.
2
Detected by what? It is important to note that the CWC verification regime simply states any nation can ask for an immediate inspection of a suspected site, and does not get into specifics on how the treaty is monitored. So the regime complements, but does not replace, existing U. S. intelligence sources and methods, which will remain the primary means for monitoring treaty compliance in a timely and definitive fashion. 3 It is safe to say that "existing U. S. intelligence sources and methods" use space assets, and future monitoring of the CWC will also place a premium on the use of space assets.
Future Treaty Monitoring
The future monitoring of the treaty has its roots in previous monitoring practices, which date back to the Cold War and centered on the nuclear arms race. Reconnaissance satellites played an important role in verifying nuclear arms treaties during the extended Cold War period. For decades, satellites have been able to detect missile silos, mobile missiles, nuclear test preparations and other nuclear activities. 4 Arms treaties in the Cold War era set limits on missile improvements that would have changed the diameter of a missile by barely three inches-and since satellites are the means by which treaties are verified, it has to be assumed that the satellites could see such a change. Farther into the future, the use of advanced optical imaging will contribute to the treaty monitoring process. Current technology has multispectral imagery satellites on orbit, but advances in hyperspectral and ultraspectral imagery will ultimately be the key to chemical manufacturing detection. 8 Detection of vapors and effluent liquids associated with many manufacturing processes could be accomplished by a mass spectrometer that ionizes samples at ambient pressure using an efficient corona discharge.
9
These techniques are currently found in state-of-the-art environmental monitoring systems.
There are also spectrometers that can analyze chemical samples from glass vials. 10 Using this technology, combined with hyperspectral and ultraspectral capability, which will increase the sensitivity necessary to monitor sites from the distance of space, is the challenge that needs to be solved to monitor the CWC from satellites in the future.
Once the challenge of monitoring with either hyper or ultraspectral imagery satellites is solved, then the next evolutionary step would be to collect and fuse data from all sensory inputs-optical, olfactory, infrared, multispectral, tactile, acoustical, laser radar, millimeter wave radar, X-ray, DNA patterns, and human intelligence-to identify objects, people or processes. The idea would be to compare a sensory signature against a preloaded database to identify matches or changes in the signature for identification or comparison. 11 Once again, it's just a matter of time before satellites can be packaged with stronger sensors and faster computer packages to accomplish this task.
With technological advances occurring rapidly, the future issue for the treaty will be how to deal with treaty violations when a site is no longer "suspected," but "confirmed" from space. When the treaty was written sometime before 1992, the idea of confirming chemical processes from space probably wasn't envisioned. The way the current treaty is written, even if a site is confirmed from space, the host nation will be allowed time to sanitize the area, which doesn't make much sense. It's still too early to tell if such capability will ever be developed, but the OPCW must be cognizant of it and understand how this change in capability could effect future treaty monitoring. Based on the different political and technical issues discussed in this paper, it would be very easy to state the need for a future follow-on treaty that would address these issues and make the chemical weapons ban more effective. But it is really too early to make that kind of statement, because not enough has happened yet to back it up.
States are just beginning to get their initial inspections, and only on military sites since no country has submitted a complete list of its commercial manufacturers to the OPCW, and because the OPCW has been slow to set up its organization due to initial budgetary problems. Legislation to update the export control lists and strengthen law enforcement capabilities has not yet occurred. There has yet to be a challenge inspection, so the issues of world resolve and willingness to impose sanctions will remain untested.
Likewise, no country has been caught in any illegal activity, either manufacturing the newly banned chemical weapons in their own country, or selling the banned chemicals to other countries. Finally, it must get closer to April 29, 2000 before the issue of nonratification becomes clearer, because that is when the current non-ratifiers will face the loss of revenues in trading Schedule 2 chemicals. Based on all this, it doesn't make sense to rush to judgment on the need for a follow-on treaty at this time. Once the treaty has had a few years to mature and be tested, then a true assessment can be made about the need for a follow-on treaty.
